Wiki page BPFK Section: Subordinators changed
> John E Clifford scripsit:
>
> > "not green" can't mean "camel" unless
> > camels definitionally are not green).
>
> Why isn't it enough that camels are
> contingently not green?
>
Good enough for practical purposes, but it does
get into problems in Dr. Seuss for example, where
camels might well be green. Of course, even when
something is technically possible --e.g., "not
red" when the fact is "is a spirit" — the first
tendency is to take the lowest level
incompatible, in this case another color. {na'e}
points to that lowest level incompatibility
(however, the ordering of level is dense, so
there is always a lower level than the one chosen
and so, by parity, any one can be taken as lowest
level). the difference is mainly pragmatic, what
our expectations should be: {na'e} another
whatever it is that is denied, {na} no
expectations supported (not that the inference
from 'not a' to any particular b is ever
justified anyhow).