WikiDiscuss

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wrote:

>
> pc:
> > Reference is to particulars.
>
> OK, but what counts as a particular is left to
> ontology. No need for us to dictate what is or
> what
> is not a thing. And I certainly don't want
> things to
> be fixed once for any and all contexts.
True enough. but we have some givens in Lojban
and if you want some more you ought to introduce
them explicitly (and definitionally, if
possible). I have trouble imagining what is left
out here.

> > Now, if you want
> > generality, you have two choices — one not
> > officially available in Lojban. You can use
> > quantifiers — and whichever one you pick
> will
> > generate the problems mentioned above
>
> I don't use quantifiers for unquantified terms.

But what terms are quantified is a matter of
interpretation. {lo} descriptions are not
quantified as such, but at least one plausible
interpretation of them is that they involve an
underlying quantifier — or several.

> > — or you
> > can use some modal notion like "generally" or
> > "usually" or "typically."
>
> Which need not always be made explicit. Context
> can
> determine whether you are speaking in general
> terms
> or not.
Very true, but, if you are going to claim that
something is meant generally, you should make
sure the context does determine that. {lo rozgu
cu xunre} without context is particular, not
general — almost exactly what your second
definition has it be.

> > Lojban doesn't have
> > those but clearly needs them.
>
> {ta'e} and {na'o} would seem to be for
> something of
> that sort. But I agree this area needs more
> clarification,
> if not necessarily more words.

Yes, it has some items in the area, but none
really clearly spelled out. I recall taht
someone used {na'o} in an attempt to explain
{lo'e}, which seems right. {ta'e}, as
"habitually", looks like it belongs, with {ka'e}
as "able to," as a brivla not a modal. Nothing
looks like "generally" or "usually" really. But
they are relatively easy to add.

> > As modal notions
> > they do take one out of the real world into
> > idealized ones of some sort — but then, in
> that
> > world, {lo rozgu} picks out some roses, all
> of
> > which or some of which are or are not red and
> on
> > that hinges the truth about {lo rozgu}. I
> note
> > in passing that your second definition of
> {lo}
> > makes it not only particular roses but
> specific
> > ones, "the obvious ones in the context"
> (assuming
> > that {zo'e} is meaningful and a referring
> > expression in a definition context).
>
> The obvious ones in some context might be roses
> in general.

But those aren't ones in any context. Roses in
general are just (like typical roses) about the
general situation with particular roses in each.

> > Your first
> > definition (otherwise generally better)
> contains
> > the unexplained "generic reference," for
> which I
> > cannot find a plausible interpretation still
> > after all these years (quantifiers or
> reference
> > to a genus or species having both been
> rejected).
>
> Maybe your ontology is too restrictive.

Maybe. How would you expand it — keeping with
things , not with mere forms of words.

> > The basic problem is that a claim, to be
> > meaningful, has to have some way of verifying
> it,
> > at least in principle.
>
> Is that a claim? If so, how do I verify it?

It is definitional. It is also a matter of
practical concern: if something is claimed and
you are concerned about whether it is true or
not, you have to have a way of finding out — at
least in principle.

> > How would you verify {lo rozgu cu xunre}?
>
> In what context?

I assume that you mean it here as a general claim
about roses. You apparently mean something by it
other than that there are red roses (which is
easy to verify), but it is not clear what more.

> > If nom particular roses are
> > relevant then it seems impossible to do, if
> some
> > are then the question is how many of them are
> > needed to show the claim true (or how are
> they
> > distributed, which is an only slightly more
> > complex case). You can say that quantifiers
> > don't count, but in the real world they
> almost
> > always do.
>
> When quantifiers are important, they should be
> made
> explicit.

Very likely true, but since they always are and
it is often clear what ones are involved, we
leave them out whenever possible. The conflicts
between logic and language are inherent in spoken
Lojban. However, in explaining Lojban, we try to
do justice to both. Your line of chat so far
helps with neither.