WikiDiscuss

WikiDiscuss


BPFK Section: Inexact Numbers

posts: 2388


wrote:

>
> pc:
> > The point is that in the real
> > world things come singly and each or several
> of
> > them do something to accomplish what we say
> > happens. What we say may be vague in a
> variety
> > of ways, but what happens is not. But
> however
> > vague our talk may be, it has to hook up with
> > what happens in some way and thus has to take
> > account of the fact that every event involves
> > some number of things. Whatever we say is
> then
> > going to reflect this some how, at the risk
> of
> > not saying anything about the world or saying
> > impossible things.
>
> That's all metaphysics, it is not something one
> needs
> to believe in order to speak Lojban, or English
> for
> that matter. What counts as a thing is not
> dictated by
> the language, need not be context independent,
> and need
> not be specified in the description of the
> language.
>
Well, I would deny that it is strictly
metaphysics, but even if it is it has to be dealt
with in our speech. To be sure, what counts as a
thing is to some extent governed by our language
(that is, after all, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis
that Loglan was designed to examine — and did a
remarkably bad job of doing, given its inherent
metaphysics). What we pick out of the world as
things to talk about is, of course, largely
dependent on context — in cluding the language
used — but it helps if it is there is some sense
to pick.

> > Well, as you know, I think {lo broda} is just
> a
> > quantified expression (not equivalent to
> {su'o
> > da}, howver, which is more complex) and that
> > takes care of generality or particularity
> > depending on context and usage. For general
> > contexts, the quantifiers involved tend to be
> > pretty vague (typically more than "most" and
> less
> > than "all") with details coming in from
> further
> > context. But what the cointexts fills in is
> how
> > we go about answering the question "is this
> claim
> > true?" Will a not even very random sample do
> or
> > is more research needed, where is the
> > cost/benefit break in research — and in
> > confirming or denying, for that matter.
>
> I can't tell from that how your take would
> differ from mine.
> If {lo broda} always has a context dependent
> and very complex
> quantifier, your interpretation may in effect
> very well end
> up agreeing with my interpretation in all
> cases. We would
> need example sentences that we would interpret
> differently
> in a given context to decide.

Metaphysics aside, I would expect that we end up
at about the same place. After all, we are both
reasonably careful observers of what goes on.
But the metaphysics — or at least the logic --
is important for understanding at least and there
is where we generally disagree.
BTW, in working out a hard case, I suddenly saw
where your idea that descriptions are constants
came from (in my terms, that is). For a number
of purposes it is handy if quantifiers (all
importing, not quite by the way)carried "namely
riders" which limit the scope of the quantifiers
strictly speaking but provide a way to continue
the reference outside the scope. I think this
goes back to Partee's paper of donkey years ago,
but I can't check. And building it in in such a
way as to come out right under negations is a
nice technical problem.

> > > > But {lo rozgu cu
> > > > xunre} is not limited to taht use; it
> does
> > > > perfectly well as the beginning of a
> story
> > > about
> > > > a totally particular event — a date,
> say.
> > >
> > > It certainly does. It all depends on the
> > > context.
> >
> > If you agree to that, then you will concede
> that
> > your first definition (second too but for
> > different reasons) is just wrong. {lo} is not
> > generic in the sense you seem to want, though
> it
> > can be used in that way
>
> What wording would you suggest for the
> definition?
> Would you be happy with it if I remove the
> "generically"?

Well, that would help> I suggest
"nonspecifically" except that that needs
defining, too, even though it has a standard one
for this context somewhere. This will make the
contrast with {le} clear and open the way to the
right variety of uses.

> > At most these ways share the feature of
> > being inspecific, just what we would expect
> from
> > the usual contrast with the specific {le} --
> a
> > contrast omitted in your second definition
> and
> > misstated in the first.
>
> The specificity is included in that definition
> by requiring
> the {skicu} relationship to hold between the
> speaker, the
> audience and the thing in question. The speaker
> has to have
> the thing in mind in order to describe it to
> the audience.
> I'm sure the definition can be improved, but I
> don't think
> it's hopeless.
>
No definition is hopeless as long as we have
erasers. I am not at all sure that specificity
is inherent in the {skicu} relation. After all,
when one says {_lo_ broda} one is describing the
thing as a broda but it is still nonspecific.
Specificity seems to be a matter of whether the
object is already in the context in some way;
{le} serves to bring those particulars of the
context into focus; {lo} to bring them into the
context altogether. That is not all the two do,
of course, but it seems to be a significant part
of the whole. (I am not sure just how the
internal context and the external interact. We
can sometimes bring the external into the
internal without introduction and at other times
seem to need a introduction. Focus may be
important here as well.)