WikiDiscuss

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wrote:

>
> pc:
> > But, whether or not {lo broda} ends up
> > being a constant, it starts as a description,
> and
> > that can be unmet: {lo pavyseljirna} has no
> > referent but is perfectly acceptable in other
> > ways in the language — or do you just shiift
> to
> > another domain when such expressions occur,
> even
> > without other indications of the shift?
>
> I think {lo pavyseljirna} usually does have a
> referent,
> and so for example {lo pavyseljirna cu se
> ranmi} is true.

This is one of the ungoing paradoxes — if the
sentence is true, then {lo pavyseljirna} has no
referent and so the sentence is not true, whether
false or meaningless. The only consistent way I
know to handle it in the present context is to
say (reasonably, though messily) that {1ranmi} is
an intensional context, taking us to an alternate
situation in which there are unicorns.
Personally, I would rather insist that {1 ranmi}
only makes sense when it is filled
(extensionally) with an intensional object,
either a property or a situation. Since the
appropriate object is usually clear from the
context it is usually enough to mention an
crucial part of it in a {tu'a} phrase. But that
would take a lot of rewriting of definitions and
so seems — at least unti we get a definition
tidying project going (as we might for eexample
in taking on plural qunatification). So, I leave
the paradox for now; it rarely causes much
trouble.

> > There are
> > also accidental shifts, given that there are
> > brodas and brodes you might expect there to
> be
> > {lo broda poi brode}, but there may not be.
>
> In that case, you wouldn't be talking about
> anything when
> you use {lo broda poi brode}. A {ki'a} or
> {na'i} reaction
> might be appropriate. But I think in such cases
> there will
> at least be a postulated referent, which is
> something
> referrable.

Whoa!. OK, there is another way to deal with
this, namely allowing for the outer domain --
possible objects and perhaps even impossible
ones. I prefer to shift to alternate situations,
clearly marked. Of course, the whole may be in
an alternate situation already, as when we are
reasoning under hypothesis, in which case the
situation outside the hypothesis is not relevant
and so there is not problem (assuming that the
hypothesis supplies the actually missing things).

> > Grammar is pretty free from facts, but truth
> is
> > not.
>
> Lojban grammar certainly allows the
> construction of meaningless
> bridi (as does any human language, I suppose).

Yup, though as noted, I like the ones that look
OK but mess up just about whether some set is
non-null to be false rather than meaningless. I
like to save {nai} for clear cases of
presupposition failure and I read "no broda"
cases as failure of an implication instead.
Either way will work, however. I wonder if {ki'a}
is appropriate here — thi is less confusion --
or even inability to determine a referent — and
more just saying somehting that appears wrong.
The correct reponse seems to me to be "But there
aren't any unicorns" or whatever.

>
> > OK (aside from the part about it being a
> > constant — that still gives problems), you
> use a
> > gappy or many-valued truth system, with the
> extra
> > piece of space being "meaningless" (and
> deopping
> > out of the overall valuation if the result
> can
> > be otherwise determined?)
>
> I don't understand the question. Could you give
> an example?

Which kind of built in meaningless do you favor?
If, for example, if one component of a
disjunction is meaningless and the other true, is
the whole true or meaningless (and corresponding
things for other connectives)

>
> > If {lo broda} had many referents, it would be
> > many things, but, given the underlying logic
> of
> > Lojban, it cannot have many referents.
>
> I guess "the underlying logic of Lojban" is
> something
> accessible to you but not to me, so it is
> pointless to argue
> that point.

It seems to be quite out in the open; it is
singular logic. Reference is a function (part of
the general conditions for singluar logic --
maybe definitional) and therefore (this is
definitional) each referring expression can have
only one referent (with variations about whether
it can have none). Of course, since {lo broda} is
a deescription (apparently), not a logical
constant, its reference is not found directly by
that function but by some calculations. (I don't
think {lo broda} really is a description, but on
my workup it would be even further from directly
assigned reference.) The calculations do not
introduce something different from the one
expression - one referent rule of of direct
reference. Indeed, they could not, since then
such expressiions could never justify true
particular generalization nor be justifeied by
true universals — not a desirable situation in a
logical language.

>
> > > > I didn't realize that I had said that
> {lo'i
> > > > broda} had a different referent from {da
> poi
> > > > selcmi be lo broda} (I assume that this
> has a
> > > > built in namely-rider so that it has a
> > > referent
> > > > at all), only different from {lo selcmi
> be lo
> > > > broda}, unless you are identifying them
> as
> > > well,
> > > > which seems against something you said
> > > elsewhere,
> > > > presumably on another topic altogether.
> > >
> > > Not sure what you mean. What I said was:
> > >
> > > > > The bit you were presenting until
> recently,
> > > > > where {lo'i broda}
> > > > > and {lo pa selcmi be lo broda} have
> > > different
> > > > > referents, is
> > > > > not something I would want.
> > >
> > And I repeat, where did I say that as opposed
> to
> > saying that {lo'i broda} and {lo selcmi be lo
> > broda} have different referents? I can't
> find it.
>
> You may be reading {lo pa selcmi} as {da poi
> selcmi}, that's
> the only explanation I can think of to explain
> this exchange.

I'm not but I never denied the equation which

• you* offered and charged me with denying. Have

I missed something here?

> Anyway, how's this:
>
> (1) mi cuxna fi ko'a goi lo'i karda
> I choose from a set of cards.
>
> (2) mi cuxna fi ko'e goi lo selcmi be lo karda
> I choose from a set of cards.
> (Ontologically different one from
> before, even if in the end it consists of
> the same cards.)
>
> (3) ko'a na du ko'e
>
> Therefore:
>
> (4) mi cuxna fi su'o re da
> I choose from at least two sets.
>
> I disagree with (3), of course, so for me (4)
> does not follow from (1)
> and (2).

Well, I would of course say that 2 is a bad
translation and is presumably false in the
present context. I agree that 4 does not follow
and I do hold that 3 is true.
I do not know how {da poi selcmi be lo broda}
snuck into this, so drop all that.