WikiDiscuss

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> The relevant change concerns what the outer quantifier
> quantifies over; at the time that I tuned out, we seemed
> to be in agreement that (i) there was a significant distinction
> between quantifying over instances of a kind and quantifying
> over subkinds of a kind, (ii) PA + gadri constructions
> ought probably to be underspecified with regard to the
> distinction,

Yes, and that remains so.

> and (iii) there needed to be some way to
> make the distinction, e.g. using LAhE. I'm saying this
> just in order to jog your memory & explain where I'm coming
> from; I'm not trying to resuscitate that old scheme and
> undermine xorlo.

I more or less remember it like that too. The BPFK has not voted
on LAhE yet. I don't suppose any of the existing LAhEs could be
recycled for this, but in principle new LAhEs with the meaning
{lo klesi be} and {lo mupli be} (or brivla with the appropriate
place structure) could be introduced.

Would you agree that the subkind/instance distinction is orthogonal
to the intensional issue? We have the two readings for the instance
case, and two readings for the subkind case: there is a certain kind
of doctor such that I need that kind of doctor vs. I need any kind
of doctor.

> Pe'i imaginary things exist by virtue of being imaginable, but
> they don't exist in the same world as real things. But anyway,
> my point is that Mr Dog exists but is not a dog in our
> local world, and likewise Mr Real World Dog exists but is not
> a dog in our local real world.
>
> > Mr Exister in the RW has to exist in the RW, that's in fact all
> > it needs to do.
>
> In that case, we must understand different things by "Mr X".

Have you abandoned the myopic singularizer view? You now seem to be
giving Mr X a more independent existence from that of its instances.
I think Mr X is just its instances, in a similar way that John is
his time slices, for example. Does John not exist in the world where
his time slices exist?

> > How was the distinction handled in the ancestral version
> > according to you?
>
> {lo broda} denoted brodakind. Actual broda were instances of
> {lo broda}.

If that means {lo broda cu zasti le ma'a munje} was generally
false, then that's not my understanding of what {lo broda}
denoted. If brodakind generally exists in our world, then maybe
we are just using different words to say the same thing.

> {PA lo broda} was neutral between quantifying over
> instances of brodakind and over subkinds of brodakind, but
> the distinction could be made e.g. by LAhE, pending appropriate
> decisions about how LAhE worked.

That's my understanding of how it is for {PA lo broda}. LAhEs
are still open for discussion.

> For certain sorts of
> intensional readings of quantified sumti in intensional sumti
> places, quantification would be over subkinds. For extensional
> readings, quantification would be over instances.

I think the two issues are separate. The suggested way of dealing
with intensional cases is by not forcing obligatory reference to
each instance separately.

> As I have said, though, I don't intend to suggest a reversion
> to that scheme.

I understand that. I agree there have been some changes with respect
to the original scheme, but we disagree somewhat on what those changes
have been.

mu'o mi'e xorxes

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