WikiDiscuss

WikiDiscuss


xorlo & mi nitcu lo mikce

xorxes:
> --- And:
> > xorxes:
> > > --- And:
> > > > The relevant change concerns what the outer quantifier
> > > > quantifies over; at the time that I tuned out, we seemed
> > > > to be in agreement that (i) there was a significant distinction
> > > > between quantifying over instances of a kind and quantifying
> > > > over subkinds of a kind, (ii) PA + gadri constructions
> > > > ought probably to be underspecified with regard to the
> > > > distinction,
> > >
> > > Yes, and that remains so.
> >
> > Surely not, since PA + gadri in xorlo involves quantification
> > over the referents of the gadri. (The similarity is that
> > in xorlo the referents of the gadri may be subkinds or
> > instances of a kind — the distinction, if relevant, to be
> > glorked. Correct me if I err.)
>
> That's correct. So in effect {PA lo broda} has the same
> uses either way.

Yes.

> > Jumping the gun, I note for the record that if LAhE are equivalent
> > to {lo broda be} then they aren't a solution, since the {lo}
> > reintroduces the ambiguity that the LAhE is supposed to eliminate.
>
> I think {lo klesi be} disambiguates one way (or eventually it
> shows there is a possible third reading, and then an infinite
> series).
>
> > > We have the two readings for the instance
> > > case, and two readings for the subkind case: there is a certain kind
> > > of doctor such that I need that kind of doctor vs. I need any kind
> > > of doctor.
> >
> > In the scheme we called XS, that would have been {su'o -subkind lo
> > mikce} versus {lo su'o -subkind lo mikce}.
>
> Yes, and now {su'o klesi be lo mikce} versus {lo klesi be lo mikce}.

OK.

> > Anyway, I agree that the subkind/instance distinction is orthogonal
> > to "any" readings of intensional sumti-places, since you & me (at
> > least) are of the view that "any" readings don't involve quantification
> > (when not given a propositionalist paraphrase). But it's not orthogonal
> > to pixra-type intensionals.
>
> I think the same possibilities exist for pixra:
> a) A picture of a doctor (Dr Smith)
> b) A picture of a doctor (no one in particular)
> c) A picture of a doctor (a cardiologist)
> d) A picture of a doctor (no speciality in particular)

Yes, (a-d) are possibilities. But (a) has a further ambiguity according
to whether the doctor exists in the same world as the picture. I understand
that the universe of discourse idea is supposed to do away with that
ambiguity, by including individuals from different worlds in one and
the same universe, and having quantification range over individuals
in the UoD. But there are good practical reasons for wanting to be
able to make the distinction if we choose to, since it — the distinction
between real broda and imaginary broda — is one we often make.

> > But the ambiguity of "We ate the same meal" hinges on the
subkind/instance
> > contrast but is not intensional.
>
> Yes, this is a better example to separate the two issues.
>
> > > > > Mr Exister in the RW has to exist in the RW, that's in fact all
> > > > > it needs to do.
> > > >
> > > > In that case, we must understand different things by "Mr X".
> > >
> > > Have you abandoned the myopic singularizer view?
> >
> > I don't think Mr X comes into existence through myopic singularization,
> > but I do think that Mr X becomes manifest in the world through myopic
> > singularization.
>
> OK. Where we disagree is that I don't want manifestation in the
> world as a grammatical category. We can say of {lo broda} that
> it mafifests itself in the world, or that it doesn't, or say
> nothing about that point (it may be irrelevant).

I don't necessarily want manifestation to be a grammatical category.
But I do want a way to determine truth-conditions, specifically in
determining which world a proposition is claimed to be true of.

It may sound like I am introducing a wholly new idea, but I believe
that the general lojbanological understanding was, implicitly, that
all propositions in a clause were claimed to be true of one and
the same world. That is no longer the case, since {ti pixra pa
-detective} can now describe a depiction of Sherlock Holmes, even
when it is mutually manifest in the context that Holmes is a
literary fiction. I think therefore that there has been an
ontological shift in Lojban of late. I don't object to it, but I
do think there ought to be a way of expressing things with the
old-style meaning too.

> > > You now seem to be
> > > giving Mr X a more independent existence from that of its instances.
> > > I think Mr X is just its instances, in a similar way that John is
> > > his time slices, for example. Does John not exist in the world where
> > > his time slices exist?
> >
> > Yes, but Mr X exists (abstractly, in the noosphere) even when it has
> > no instances. Mr Unicorn, Mr AIDS Cure, and so forth. Mr X's
> > manifestation in the world is its instances, though, just as you say.
>
> "Exists" as in "can be included in the universe of discourse",
> "is a possible value for a variable", yes. "Exists" in the sense
> "is manifest in the physical world", not necessarily (it may
> or may not be). So I don't think we disagree on that.

Right.

> > In my ontology, this is, of course. I'm not asking anybody else
> > to swallow it.
>
> I enjoy ruminating different ontologies. :-)
>
> > > > For certain sorts of
> > > > intensional readings of quantified sumti in intensional sumti
> > > > places, quantification would be over subkinds. For extensional
> > > > readings, quantification would be over instances.
> > >
> > > I think the two issues are separate. The suggested way of dealing
> > > with intensional cases is by not forcing obligatory reference to
> > > each instance separately.
> >
> > Can you explain, with an example? I don't follow you.
>
> All I meant is that you can make reference to Mr Broda without
> making reference to its eventual instances of manifestation.

OK.

--And.