WikiDiscuss

1. Right. But if I fear unicorns, the unicorns in my mental world which are the object of my fear are under the same rules — in that mental world — as the cows I kick are in this external world. Note that the fear is in this world, only its object is in the other (which is why it is useful to mark the points where we pass from one world to the next to find references).
xod <xod@thestonecutters.net> wrote:1.It's possible to fear something which no longer exists or which never
existed. The fear is real and in this world regardless of the reality of
the feared. That's about all I have to report about the fact that
existence is not a factor in intensional references, while it is for
extensions and typicals.

John E Clifford wrote:

>1. OK. What is the probolem here. There is nothing in the external world thatI fear. But surely there is something in the world of my beliefs or imagination or wherever it s that the objects of fear reside. Otherwise by what right is it that we say I fear something?
>xod wrote:John E Clifford wrote:
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>>I'll get to RXS itself later; this is just cleaning up my inbox.
>>1. An arguable point: can't we talk about a typical unicorn even if there aren't any unicorns? Or maybe that is just stereotypical.
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>>2. the conditions on intensional cases is the same as on extensional, it is just that the relevant world is different (no longer this one).
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>1.Consider the case of fearing something which doesn't actually exist.
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