xorlo & mi nitcu lo mikce
> xorxes:
> > > xorxes:
> > > > The (present?) material world is not
> especially favoured by the
> > > > _grammar_ as the universe of discourse,
> although it is a very
> > > > frequent obvious choice in many contexts.
> > >
> > > Okay, but one would like to somehow be able
> to make unambiguous
> > > claims to the effect that exactly two
> things have the property of
> > > doctorhood in the world in which I need
> them.
> >
> > That would be {re da mikce}, "exactly two
> things have the
> > property of being a doctor".
>
> I.e. {re da zo'u ge da mikce gi mi nitcu da}?
> So that is not
> synonymous with {mi nitcu re mikce}? (That's a
> neutral question.)
>
> > > In other words,
> > > that one can go out into the world in which
> my needing occurs,
> > > and find & grab hold of these two
> individuals that are doctors.
> >
> > By "universe of discourse" I mean the set of
> things that we may
> > make reference to in a given discourse. In
> one context, {lo mikce}
> > may have a single referent in the universe of
> discourse, in other
> > contexts it may have more than one. In any
> context,
> > {mi nitcu re lo mikce} says that exactly two
> of the referents of
> > {lo mikce} (from all the referents of the
> universe of discourse)
> > are such that I need them. In that discourse,
> I don't need any
> > of the other referents of {lo mikce} (from
> all the referents
> > in the universe of discourse).
>
> I understand this — the universe of discourse
> can simultaneously
> contain something that is a needer in World X
> but not necessarily
> in World Y, and something that is a doctor in
> World Y but not
> necessarily in World X.
>
> But what I'm asking is how to say "something is
> such that in
> one and the same world, I need it and it is a
> doctor".
I can't really speak for Dr.Dr. but I suppose we
can do it with a prenexed quantified expression,
i.e., outside the **** (I won't say the dreaded
words out of kindness to weak sensibilities) and
probably also using token reflexive devices that
drag things out of those places: "that doctor
right over there," "my neighbor Dr. Brown", etc.
> > > For clarity, a second example: There is an
> ambiguity in "I drew
> > > two unicorns" that doesn't exist in "I ate
> two unicorns". How
> > > can one remove the ambiguity, if one wanted
> to do so?
> >
> > Do you mean the "I drew two unicorns" that is
> like "I took
> > a photograph of two unicorns" vs. the "I drew
> two unicorns"
> > that is like "I made two unicorns out of
> clay"? maybe we can
> > distinguish them with different predicates:
> >
> > mi pirfi'i lo re pavyseljirna
> > I picture-created two unicorns.
> >
> > mi pirfukygau lo re pavyseljirna
> > I picture-copy-made two unicorns.
> >
> > You can draw two unicorns into existence, but
> you can't
> > eat them into existence, so that would be the
> difference
> > between those predicates.
>
> That's not really the distinction I mean. Our
> local mythology
> may contain unicorns that already exist in that
> mythology.
> I might draw two of them (Dasher and Prancer,
> say) without
> thereby bringing them into existence. But "I
> photographed
> two unicorns", unlike "I drew two unicorns",
> entails that
> the photographees exists in the same world as
> the one in
> which I took the photo.
i.e. the one in which the things photographed
exist (cf. eating unicorns and other kinds of
physical interactions — being run down by one
say). *** is coming up again.
> > > > I think that unless the grammar is to
> impose an ontology,
> > > > that distinction can't be made with
> gadri. One way to make
> > > > it is through prediacates: "is a subkind
> of", "is an instance
> > > > of"
> > >
> > > I understand your reasoning, but "lo
> instance of lo mikce"
> > > would not guarantee that we are referring
> to actual instances;
> > > we could be referring to imaginable
> instances. That's why
> > > I can't see how to do it without involving
> gadri. (More
> > > precisely, I can't see how to do it without
> having a way
> > > to distinguish quantification over subkinds
> from quantification
> > > over instances.)
I look forward to seein how this turns out to
be relevant. I don't see it now, unless you want
to sorta save Dr. Dr. by saying that what is
meant is Dr. A-Certain-Kind-of-Doctor. But that
helpeth not.
> > Would that require fixing the universe of
> discourse
> > to the one set of referents we all agree are
> true material
> > indivisible objects in the real meterial
> world, irrespective
> > of context? I don't think that's desirable,
> but I'm not sure
> > it's even possible. For some broda we may all
> agree on what
> > counts as a true individual concrete real
> single broda for
> > any and all contexts, but for many broda we
> won't, it will
> > depend on context.
>
> I opine that a proposition is claimed to be
> true of some
> particular world (-- and the universe of
> discourse can
> span many worlds). I further opine that it is
> desirable to
> have some way to indicate whether two
> propositions (such as
> "mi nitcu da" and "da mikce") are claimed true
> of the same
> world (since there seems to me to be a pretty
> patent
> distinction in meaning).
>
> I was about to explain what I meant by
> "instances", in the
> light of what I have just said, but I'll take
> things slowly.
>
> --And.
>
>
>