WikiDiscuss

xorxes:
> --- And:
> > The relevant change concerns what the outer quantifier
> > quantifies over; at the time that I tuned out, we seemed
> > to be in agreement that (i) there was a significant distinction
> > between quantifying over instances of a kind and quantifying
> > over subkinds of a kind, (ii) PA + gadri constructions
> > ought probably to be underspecified with regard to the
> > distinction,
>
> Yes, and that remains so.

Surely not, since PA + gadri in xorlo involves quantification
over the referents of the gadri. (The similarity is that
in xorlo the referents of the gadri may be subkinds or
instances of a kind — the distinction, if relevant, to be
glorked. Correct me if I err.)

> > and (iii) there needed to be some way to
> > make the distinction, e.g. using LAhE. I'm saying this
> > just in order to jog your memory & explain where I'm coming
> > from; I'm not trying to resuscitate that old scheme and
> > undermine xorlo.
>
> I more or less remember it like that too. The BPFK has not voted
> on LAhE yet. I don't suppose any of the existing LAhEs could be
> recycled for this, but in principle new LAhEs with the meaning
> {lo klesi be} and {lo mupli be} (or brivla with the appropriate
> place structure) could be introduced.

Jumping the gun, I note for the record that if LAhE are equivalent
to {lo broda be} then they aren't a solution, since the {lo}
reintroduces the ambiguity that the LAhE is supposed to eliminate.

> Would you agree that the subkind/instance distinction is orthogonal
> to the intensional issue?

Yes and no...

> We have the two readings for the instance
> case, and two readings for the subkind case: there is a certain kind
> of doctor such that I need that kind of doctor vs. I need any kind
> of doctor.

In the scheme we called XS, that would have been {su'o -subkind lo
mikce} versus {lo su'o -subkind lo mikce}.

Anyway, I agree that the subkind/instance distinction is orthogonal
to "any" readings of intensional sumti-places, since you & me (at
least) are of the view that "any" readings don't involve quantification
(when not given a propositionalist paraphrase). But it's not orthogonal
to pixra-type intensionals.

But the ambiguity of "We ate the same meal" hinges on the subkind/instance
contrast but is not intensional.

> > Pe'i imaginary things exist by virtue of being imaginable, but
> > they don't exist in the same world as real things. But anyway,
> > my point is that Mr Dog exists but is not a dog in our
> > local world, and likewise Mr Real World Dog exists but is not
> > a dog in our local real world.
> >
> > > Mr Exister in the RW has to exist in the RW, that's in fact all
> > > it needs to do.
> >
> > In that case, we must understand different things by "Mr X".
>
> Have you abandoned the myopic singularizer view?

I don't think Mr X comes into existence through myopic singularization,
but I do think that Mr X becomes manifest in the world through myopic
singularization.

> You now seem to be
> giving Mr X a more independent existence from that of its instances.
> I think Mr X is just its instances, in a similar way that John is
> his time slices, for example. Does John not exist in the world where
> his time slices exist?

Yes, but Mr X exists (abstractly, in the noosphere) even when it has
no instances. Mr Unicorn, Mr AIDS Cure, and so forth. Mr X's
manifestation in the world is its instances, though, just as you say.

In my ontology, this is, of course. I'm not asking anybody else
to swallow it.

> > > How was the distinction handled in the ancestral version
> > > according to you?
> >
> > {lo broda} denoted brodakind. Actual broda were instances of
> > {lo broda}.
>
> If that means {lo broda cu zasti le ma'a munje} was generally
> false, then that's not my understanding of what {lo broda}
> denoted. If brodakind generally exists in our world, then maybe
> we are just using different words to say the same thing.

On my understanding, a brodakind, if it has instances that exist
in our world, itself exists in our world, in the sense of being
manifest in our world. But it also exists outside of our world,
too, in the noosphere along with the kinds (e.g. unicornkind)
that don't have instances that exist in our world.

> > {PA lo broda} was neutral between quantifying over
> > instances of brodakind and over subkinds of brodakind, but
> > the distinction could be made e.g. by LAhE, pending appropriate
> > decisions about how LAhE worked.
>
> That's my understanding of how it is for {PA lo broda}. LAhEs
> are still open for discussion.

Surely in xorlo {PA1 lo (PA2) broda} involves quantifying over
the (PA2) referents of {lo (PA2) broda}.

If xorlo followed XS, then the inner PA in xorlo would make no
sense. In XS, {pa lo re xirma} would be "two instances of Mr
Horse Pair" or "two subkinds of Mr Horse Pair" — which admittedly
made lVi redundant. But if xorlo {pa lo xirma} can mean
"two instances/subkinds of Mr Horse", what on earth can
xorlo {pa lo re xirma} mean? There is only one Mr Horse.

So no, I think xorlo is pretty different from XS.

> > For certain sorts of
> > intensional readings of quantified sumti in intensional sumti
> > places, quantification would be over subkinds. For extensional
> > readings, quantification would be over instances.
>
> I think the two issues are separate. The suggested way of dealing
> with intensional cases is by not forcing obligatory reference to
> each instance separately.

Can you explain, with an example? I don't follow you.

> > As I have said, though, I don't intend to suggest a reversion
> > to that scheme.
>
> I understand that. I agree there have been some changes with respect
> to the original scheme, but we disagree somewhat on what those changes
> have been.

Indeed!

--And.